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CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: PRETEXT OR 
PANACEA? 
Justin S. Brooks∗ 
Proponents of corporate compliance programs loudly sing their praises 
while detractors point to ceaseless prosecutions and a parade of civil suits—
often resulting in multi-billion dollar verdicts or settlements—as evidence that 
they are ineffective. So, are corporate compliance programs a panacea or a 
pretext? The truth lies somewhere in between. 
As a threshold issue, corporations are for-profit institutions. Indeed, most 
corporations have a mandate to maximize profit for shareholders. This can 
encourage senior management to operate in grey areas, and regulators may 
later deem their actions (and board oversight of such actions) to violate a wide 
array of laws. Second, formalistic compliance programs are not enough to 
ensure internal reporting of potential fraud and are not enough to inspire 
companies to take appropriate corrective actions. Instead, as set forth below, 
companies must take steps to ensure effective implementation of compliance 
programs and foster a culture of corporate compliance. 
The countervailing factors that motivate officers and directors to engage in 
or acquiesce to fraudulent conduct or, alternatively, devise and implement an 
effective compliance program warrant in-depth treatment in a standalone piece. 
Here, I turn to answering the specific questions posed with these general 
principles in mind. 
  
 
 ∗ Justin S. Brooks is a founding partner of Guttman, Buschner & Brooks PLLC. Mr. Brooks represents 
relators in qui tam litigation under the False Claims Act and other federal and state statutes and corporate 
clients in a wide variety of complex commercial and employment litigation. He also provides employment and 
compliance counseling to companies, represents institutional investors in shareholder derivative and corporate 
governance litigation, and represents employees in employment litigation of all types. He has represented 
clients in claims brought under the Federal False Claims Act, securities laws, the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act (WARN), Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and 
various employment discrimination, labor and environmental statutes. 
 
Prior to founding the firm, Mr. Brooks worked at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, and 
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. He also served as law clerk for a federal judge. He has authored numerous articles on 
class action litigation and other topics. 
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Question 1: Do corporate compliance programs actually suppress 
information from regulatory oversight? 
Response: Yes, often appropriately. But meritorious—and sometimes non-
meritorious—allegations of misconduct tend to get reported externally where 
internal responses are inadequate or the company has not created a culture 
of compliance and reporting. 
Recent reports, compiled through surveys of hundreds of senior executives 
from a broad range of industries, indicate that roughly two-thirds of United 
States companies are affected by fraud.1 Costs to companies, including 
reputational damage, can be substantial as can costs associated with 
remediation and investigation of fraudulent practices. 
Internal reporting programs such as corporate compliance hotlines 
represent a company’s first line of defense against corporate fraud. Internal 
whistleblower hotlines are a key component of a company’s anti-fraud 
program: where such hotlines are implemented, tips are typically the most 
common method of detecting fraud.2 Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”), international guidelines from the European Union, and the U.S. 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines have deemed hotline reporting programs a good 
and necessary business practice. At the same time, internal compliance hotlines 
serve to screen out frivolous and baseless claims. 
In my experience counseling and defending large corporations on 
employment matters and corporate compliance, reports to company 
ombudsman, managers, or human resources and compliance personnel often 
lack merit or do not implicate fraud. Employees often file malicious or 
fictitious complaints against fellow employees or the organization to ward off 
pending termination or to seek revenge for perceived slights. But treating 
employees with respect, even in these situations, can dissuade employees from 
unwarranted external reports. 
Unfortunately, despite strong incentives to self-report credible evidence of 
wrongdoing, companies may conceal such evidence. Like companies, 
whistleblowers have incentives under various statutory regimes to report 
 
 1 KROLL, 2013/2014 GLOBAL FRAUD REPORT, WHO’S GOT SOMETHING TO HIDE? 12 (2013), 
http://www.kroll.com/en-us/global-fraud-report. 
 2 See, e.g., ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD 
AND ABUSE, 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 19 (2014), https://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-
nations.pdf. 
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internally. For example, under the SEC whistleblower program established by 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) in 2010, a whistleblower’s participation in internal compliance 
systems will generally increase an award and interference with or bypass of 
those systems can decrease an award.3 A whistleblower who reports conduct to 
the SEC within 120 days of reporting internally will also receive credit for any 
information the company later self-reports to the SEC.4 
In our experience, external reporting typically follows internal reporting 
when an employee felt the company response was not adequate. As of 2014, 
80% of company insiders who reported potential misconduct to the SEC first 
raised their concerns internally to compliance personnel or their supervisors.5 
Likewise, Guttman, Buschner & Brooks attorneys have represented countless 
whistleblowers bringing cases under the False Claims Act and have helped 
recover billions of dollars on behalf of federal and state governments. In our 
experience, these whistleblowers typically reported internally first and only 
sought representation after the company responded inadequately or dismissed 
concerns as “this is the way we do business.” Thus, while corporate 
compliance hotlines and related reporting mechanisms serve as the first line of 
defense against fraud, the False Claims Act, Dodd-Frank and other 
whistleblower protection statutes effectively incentive employees to report 
fraud externally when a company’s response has been ineffective or where a 
company has not created a culture where employees feel comfortable reporting 
misconduct internally. 
Companies are most likely to dissuade external reporting by creating and 
implementing effective compliance programs as well as self-reporting credible 
allegations of misconduct. Such self-reporting may also result in cooperation 
credit. Indeed, on September 9, 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates 
issued a memo instructing the DOJ to seek individual accountability from 
individuals perpetrating wrongdoing in the course of fighting corporate fraud 
and misconduct.6The memo was sent to every United States Attorney, the 
 
 3 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(3). 
 4 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(7). 
 5 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 16 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf. 
 6 See Memorandum from the Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen. to the Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Antitrust Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., the 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Envtl. and Nat. Res. Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., the Assistant 
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Assistant Attorney General heading up each DOJ division, the Director of the 
Executive Office for United States Trustees, and the Director of the FBI. 
Consistent with the Yates directives, we have seen renewed focus on 
individual accountability in the False Claims Act cases we have litigated 
alongside the government over the past year. This has manifested in the 
government’s decision to name individual executives as defendants in 
complaints in intervention, the structure of settlements, and a myriad of other 
ways. 
In keeping with its renewed focus on individual liability, the Yates memo 
articulated several changes to DOJ policy regarding the definition of 
“cooperation credit” for corporations. These changes are applicable to criminal 
as well as civil enforcement matters. Corporations historically have received 
and continue to receive more favorable settlement terms when the government 
concludes they provided material cooperation with respect to a government 
investigation. But companies have struggled to understand what it means to 
“cooperate” in a post-Yates world. 
In a September 27, 2016 speech, Principal Deputy Associate Attorney 
General Bill Baer provided some insight as to what such cooperation now 
entails, highlighting the importance of prompt and material assistance.7 Merely 
responding to a subpoena or civil investigative demand (“CID”) will not 
qualify as cooperation. Rather, a company hoping to obtain cooperation credit 
is expected to provide specific information about any and all employees 
involved in wrongdoing that is unknown to DOJ and that materially assists in 
its investigations. Thus, while meritless claims not implicating fraud are 
properly vetted and disposed of through company screening without ever 
coming to the attention of government regulators and investigators, an 
effective compliance program will also develop mechanisms to affirmatively 
identify and provide material information to regulatory agencies investigating 
the company. 
 
Attorney Gen., Tax Div., the Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, the Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Trs., & all U.S. 
Attorneys (Sept. 9, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download. 
 7 See Bill Baer, Principal Deputy Assoc. Attorney Gen., Remarks at Society of Corporate Compliance 
and Ethics Conference (Sept. 27, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-associate-
attorney-general-bill-baer-delivers-remarks-society-corporate. 
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Question 2: Do corporate compliance programs create an environment 
where employees are led to believe that wrongdoing in the corporate 
environment is implausible because a compliance program exists? 
Response: No. But implicit or explicit directives from management can lead 
to false beliefs that particular actions comport with the law. 
A corporate compliance program should and generally does sensitize 
employees to the fact that wrongdoing is plausible. A strong compliance 
program often identifies the relevant laws applicable to an employees’ day-to-
day activities and may include fact patterns the company has identified as 
violative of relevant laws. For example, compliance training for 
pharmaceutical sales representatives is likely to and should inform employees 
that promoting off-label uses of company drugs can be deemed to be a 
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and likewise expose the 
company to liability under the False Claims Act.8 
Having said that, we have represented relators in False Claims Act cases in 
which company management has been warned by its own third-party 
regulatory consultants that certain conduct and types of interactions with 
physicians is proscribed. These companies have nonetheless directed such 
conduct in business plans, training documents, and other written directives to 
sales representatives. Similarly, employee performance reviews may—in 
writing—encourage conduct that is deemed by the government to be unlawful. 
Managers may also encourage such conduct when accompanying employees 
on sales detailing visits. 
Thus, the existence of written policies and a compliance program does not 
itself create an environment where employees believe wrongdoing is 
implausible. But written directives, communications, and training by 
management can cause employees to believe that particular conduct is 
appropriate and in conformity with stated company policies and cause them to 
ignore other signs or evidence that such conduct is—in fact—unlawful. 
  
 
 8 The type of conduct that qualifies as “promotion” and the degree to which certain activity may be 
protected by the First Amendment involve a nuanced assessment, is largely unsettled, and varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article.  
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Question 3: From a practical viewpoint, what kind of corporate compliance 
programs work better than others? 
Response: Corporate compliance programs that incorporate the principles of 
communication, responsiveness, and transparency 
Above all, compliance programs should be transparent and comprehensible 
to employees (and management), and the goals of enforcement mechanisms 
should be clearly communicated. Measures also must be implemented to 
ensure prompt and efficient responses to allegations of corporate wrongdoing. 
How this manifests will vary from industry to industry and company to 
company. It largely depends on the service or product a company offers, 
specific rules and regulations that govern the company, the size and geographic 
breadth of a company, and a myriad of other factors. 
In addition to general principles of communication, responsiveness, and 
transparency, certain key factors tend to underlie effective compliance 
programs: 
1. Guidelines: companies should have explicit guidelines that instruct 
employees how to perform their jobs in a legal and ethical manner, 
including training programs, codes of conduct, and written 
performance standards. 
2. Surveillance: companies should have official policies and procedures 
that detail the manner in which they will monitor employees and how 
(and to whom) employees can report wrongdoing. 
3. Sticks and Carrots: companies should identify and implement 
sanctions for wrongdoing as well as rewards in the form of promotions 
and positive reviews for demonstrated competence and compliance 
with company guidelines. A program can be well-drafted on paper but 
useless in practice if a company does not punish misconduct or reward 
behavior it wishes to incentivize. 
4. Leadership: it is not enough to have formal procedures in place to 
foster compliance. The “water cooler” conversation and conduct of 
top-level management are equally important. The “tone at the top” and 
informal communications as set by leadership behavior is critical, but 
it is equally critical for top management to monitor and instill the 
same behavioral norms in middle management. 
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5. Independence of compliance personnel. Local management are rarely 
trained as investigators, and may be part of the problem. Likewise, 
local human resources personnel may appear to employees to be 
aligned with management and unlikely to take employee concerns 
seriously, disincentivizing employees from raising concerns about 
potential misconduct. Accordingly, effective compliance programs 
often provide mechanisms for employees to report concerns to 
independent third parties (such as ombudsmen) specifically trained in 
addressing employee concerns. Depending on the nature of the 
complaint, legal personnel, compliance officers, or human resources 
personnel may need to become involved after the initial investigation 
has begun. 
Corporate compliance programs play an important role in modern corporate 
governance. But they are only as good as management’s commitment to 
effective resolution of employee concerns and implementation of corrective 
action when credible misconduct has been identified. Companies have strong 
incentives to get it right. 
